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to meld a systemic view of 
risk and resilience to the established
regulation of banks and other financial
institutions, with the aim of enhancing
the stability of the international
financial system. 
They want to add “taking account of financial
system stability” as a supplement to the core
mandates of all central banks and regulatory
authorities (see G-20 2009a, 2009b).
This paper critically explores the issue of financial
institution regulation, Canadian experience, the
factors influencing successful regulation and the
closely related issue of which entities should be
regulated to ensure the safety and soundness of the
financial system, and which institutions should have
access to the safety net. I conclude that it is essential
to have a better definition of macrosystemic risk, so
that expectations of central banks and regulators are
made clear. Further, I suggest that it is inadvisable to
assign responsibility for ensuring the stability of the
financial system to a single agency – that what
matters more are processes to promote the realistic
consideration of risk, to promote constructive
challenge among authorities, to resolve tradeoffs
among different policies, and to strengthen the will
to act. 
I also consider the G-20 case for reducing
“procyclicality” in financial regulation, as
exemplified by the international capital rules and
standards collectively known as Basel II, from the
accord on international standards reached in that
Swiss city in 2004. I argue that Basel II has
considerable benefits with respect to financial
stability that should not be undermined, that the
degree of procyclicality is not well understood, that
procyclicality is often confused with asset-bubble
issues, that models to forecast cycles accurately are
not readily available, and that inappropriately
designed policies might exacerbate cycles.
Finally, I propose a number of practical ways to
move forward, including strengthening
international peer review beyond that scheme the
G-20 proposes. 
Background
Most countries have well-established prudential
regulatory systems for banks and insurers that
focus on the health of individual institutions, have
an explicit or implicit mandate to set rules for risk-
management practices, require entities to hold
adequate capital, and exercise powers to intervene
in various ways, including, in the case of serious
deficiencies, forcing closure and resolution. These
systems are seen as contributing to public
confidence in financial institutions – a good
example is the legislative mandate of Canada’s
Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions (OSFI)
1 – and early intervention in
cases of potential financial difficulty is often seen
as key to successful regulation. The criteria for
such regulation, and related activities by banks
themselves, are codified in the Basel Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BIS
2006), which are matched by similar principles for
securities and insurance regulation. These
principles are the basis for the Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP) of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (see IMF
2009). This peer review system has assessed
publicly over one hundred countries since 1999,
but not the United States.
Some observers see “macro” or “system” stability
as more than the sum of the safety and soundness
of individual institutions (see Borio 2003; BIS
2008), yet few countries assign any explicit role to
any one organization for monitoring or regulating
macrostability. Central banks and, to some extent,
treasuries have this responsibility de facto by virtue
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1 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, RS 1985, c18 (3rd Supp), sections 3 and 4.of the former’s role as lenders of last resort and
latter’s as the only authorities that can commit
public money – although deposit insurers also are
often able to provide guarantees with government
backing. In Canada’s case, the mandate of the
Bank of Canada does not include financial system
stability  For its part, OSFI’s mandate includes
“monitoring and evaluating system-wide or
sectoral events or issues that may have a negative
impact on the financial condition of financial
institutions.”
2 But macroprudential stability
seems to mean more than that.
Problems with Predicting Macro-
Systemic Failures 
A wag once said that the trouble with early
warning is that it is early and it is only a warning.
There is more truth in that than many leaders and
policymakers are prepared to admit. In fact,
macroprudential regulation is ill defined and has
the potential to conflict both with the regulation
and supervision of individual institutions and
with other macroeconomic goals. A significant
literature concludes that unclear mandates do not
help authorities to achieve their goals, nor do they
help market participants to anticipate the actions
of authorities and to adapt their behaviour in
response. Central bankers point out that their
credibility, which is a key ingredient of their
stock-in-trade, and that of regulators suffers if the
goals of this macroprudential role are not clear
and if they lack tools that are commensurate with
the objectives they are assigned (see, for example,
Bernanke 2008). Without more clarity with
respect to mandates, peer assessments under the
FSAP cannot know what to look for and when to
praise or criticize.
Thus, a clearer definition of macroprudential
regulation is needed to determine appropriate
policy responses, the reasonable authority and
accountability arrangements for various agencies,
and the results that reasonably can be expected by
the public and legislatures. I also believe that
much can be accomplished by incorporating
lessons already learned in better fulfilling existing
mandates. It is important that these improvements
not be lost in the design of “new architecture” for
financial system regulation if progress in reducing
the incidence and severity of future financial crises
is not to be jeopardized. 
The Intention of Macroprudential
Regulation
At their summit held in London in April 2009,
the leaders of the G-20 agreed:
￿ to establish, as a successor to the Financial
Stability Forum (FSF), a new Financial
Stability Board (FSB) with a strengthened
mandate and that would include all G-20
countries’ international financial institutions
such as the IMF and the Basel committee, as
well as Spain and the European Commission; 
￿ that the FSB should collaborate with the IMF
to provide early warning of macroeconomic
and financial risks and the actions needed to
address them; 
￿ to reshape regulatory systems so that the
authorities are able to identify and take
account of macroprudential risks; and 
￿ to extend regulation and oversight to all
systemically important financial institutions,
instruments, and markets, including, for the
first time, systemically important hedge funds
(G-20 2009a).
The evolution of the G-20 as a policy-setting and
coordination group, together with the expanded
membership of both the FSB and the Basel
committee, puts these organizations in a much
better position to succeed. A working group
report to the G-20 summit notes that “national
financial regulatory frameworks should be
reinforced with a macro-prudential overlay that
promotes a system-wide approach to financial
regulation and oversight and mitigates the build-
up of excess risks across the system” (G-20 2009b,
ii). The report notes this will require better
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coordination among the various financial authorities
within each country, that their mandates should
take account of financial system stability, and that
effective tools are needed to address systemic risks.
The report also notes that rules should be
“complemented with the informed judgment of
financial sector authorities based on their joint
assessment of the risks across the financial system”
(G-20b, recommendation 3, p5). Tools suggested
include simple indicators to measure the build-up
of leverage, capital requirements that adjust over
the cycle, loan-loss provisioning that incorporate
all available credit information, the use of longer
historical samples to assess risk and margin
requirements, and a narrower focus on loan-to-
value ratios for mortgages.
3
The Development of the 
Macroprudential Concept
In the late 1990s, central banks and the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) started promoting
the idea of macroprudential regulation, or
macrostability (see BIS 2000; Crockett 2000). This
was beyond the essential contribution that
macroeconomic policies should make to the safety
and soundness of the financial system.
Macroprudential regulation would also differ from
the risk proofing of payment, clearing, and
settlement systems, and from the contribution to
public confidence and system stability of effective
prudential regulation of commercial banks,
investment banks, and insurers, backed by deposit
insurance and effective lender-of-last-resort facilities.
The concept was based on three key points: that
there were direct and indirect interconnections
among financial institutions, which were not well
understood; that different financial markets could
exhibit perfect correlation in times of crisis, thus
severely undercutting the benefits of risk
management or creating interconnections; and that
there were endogenous risks, from individual
entities’ choice of actions to protect themselves,
which could result in more macroinstability. 
In response, many central banks began to publish
and give prominence to regular financial system
reviews as a contribution to financial stability (see,
for example, Bank of Canada 2002). Internationally,
in 1998 the FSF was created at the initiative of G7
finance ministers and central bank governors on the
basis of the recommendations of the Tietmeyer
report (1999), which they had commissioned. 
The goal of the FSF, which consisted of prudential
regulators, central banks, treasuries, and inter-
national financial institutions and standards setters,
was “to promote international financial stability,
improve the functioning of financial markets 
and reduce the tendency for financial shocks to
propagate from country to country, thus destabi-
lizing the world economy” (Tietmeyer, p5). Its
mandate was to assess vulnerabilities affecting the
international financial system; to identify and
oversee action needed to address these; and to
improve coordination and information exchange
among the various authorities responsible for
financial stability (Tietmeyer 1999). Necessary
changes to enable the FSF to achieve its goals
would be enacted by the relevant national
financial authorities.
Despite all this, the international community
failed to act on the warnings it received, when
doing so could have lessened either the likelihood
of the recent crisis or its impact. Why? First, it is
important to recognize that the origin of the
problem was not worldwide, so it was not obvious
that the entire worldwide financial system needed
to be revamped. Nor was the source just
regulatory failures or bank risk-management
failures. Macro policy and other explicit policy
choices, such as the promotion of home
ownership by lower-income individuals and
resulting imbalances, were key drivers. And while
weaknesses in the US regulatory system and US
monetary policy choices were important, there
appear to have been macro policy and regulatory
and supervisory failures in the United Kingdom
and the euro zone as well. They at least added to
the spread of the crisis and its seriousness once it
3 Both a recent FSA report (Turner 2009), endorsed by the UK government, and a plan by the current US administration (United States 2009) contain
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got going. In Canada, in contrast, inflation
targeting, the regulatory system, reasonable risk
management, and other policies largely shielded
the country from serious asset bubbles and
financial system trouble, although it is still
exposed to export and foreign-lender risks. 
With the proposed establishment of the new
FSB, the G-20 hopes for an international
regulatory framework with a more interventionist
mandate, more follow-up, better staff support,
better links to the IMF, early warning exercises,
and improved reporting to G-20 finance ministers
and central bank governors. These are helpful
developments but, as I note below, crucial to
success will be the mind set and leadership to 
take reform seriously. 
In the Financial System Review that it started
publishing in 2002, the Bank of Canada noted
that it
is one of several federal and provincial agencies
and organizations in Canada that promote 
the safety and efficiency of our financial
system....The Bank contributes a broad
perspective that reflects the major activities in
which it is engaged. As the monetary authority,
the Bank brings a macroeconomic or system-
wide point of view to issues concerning the
financial sector, as well as extensive knowledge
of financial markets. As the source of ultimate
liquidity to the financial system (and, thus, the
lender of last resort) the Bank is acutely aware
of stresses that can develop in the system
during times of financial turbulence....The 
goal of the Financial System Review…is to
share with financial system participants and 
the Canadian public the Bank’s research,
analyses, and judgments on various issues and
developments concerning the financial
system…[and to] contribute to greater
understanding of such issues and promote a
more informed discussion of policy and
developments in Canada and abroad….[and
thus] enhance the efficiency and stability of the
Canadian financial system. (Bank of Canada
2002, iii.)
In the mid-1990s OSFI’s mandate was clarified to
give it formal early intervention powers and to
strengthen its will to act expeditiously in
identifying safety and soundness problems and to
force financial institutions to take appropriate
measures. Explicitly, this included the possibility
that individual institutions might fail, whereupon
OSFI would be able to apply to wind up the
failing institution. In that eventuality, OSFI is
required to consult with the minister of finance as
to whether there are public-interest reasons for not
proceeding, and if so, the government would have
to bring resources to the table to solve the
problem. Otherwise the superintendent of
financial institutions and, ultimately, the minister
would be in untenable positions vis-à-vis both
their mandates and the public if they were to
allow a nonviable entity to continue operating. 
I believe these mandate changes are key to
Canada’s success in regulating and supervising
financial institutions over the past 10 years. 
Recently, the Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation (CDIC) has received additional tools
with which to resolve failures. These generally
start with OSFI’s determining whether or not an
institution is viable, which is correctly within its
role and mandate, and then a determination by
CDIC (whose board includes public and private
sector representatives) whether it is in the interest
of system stability and least cost to assist in a
resolution or to allow liquidation. Recent
amendments allow the minister in some cases to
suspend the least-cost-determination process to
permit CDIC to consider systemic implications
by themselves. 
Canada has had experience of cooperative
mechanisms with the workings of the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Committee (FISC),
which was created by statute in the mid-1980s in
part to deal with the “will-to-act” issue in the
wake of the failure of several western Canadian
banks. Its members are the governor of the Bank
of Canada, the superintendent of financial
institutions, the deputy minister of finance, the
chair of the CDIC, and, more recently, the
commissioner of the Financial Consumer Agency
of Canada. FISC principals meet regularly, withCommentary 296 | 5
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the superintendent chairing, its minutes are
provided to the minister of finance, and it
performs post mortems on past problems.
Will to act is also strengthened by checks and
balances among FISC partners in assessing
financial conditions. If one member of FISC, for
example, were to express serious reservations about
a situation for the record, it would behoove other
members to take it seriously. At the same time,
these institutional arrangements promote
solutions that can meet the various organizations’
mandates. Clarity of understanding, constructive
tensions, respect for others’ mandates, and
continuity of senior-level involvement are
important success factors in dealing with problems
over the past 15 years. However, as I note below,
Canada is well placed to take advantage of the
room to enhance these improvements
considerably to account more effectively for
macroeconomic factors.
The Meaning of 
Macroprudential Regulation 
The concept of macroprudential regulation can be
broken down into five types, each with different
remedies (see also Borio 2008 for a review of the
macroprudential concept). Four of these can be
dealt with fairly briefly; the fifth, the idea that
regulatory rules and accounting standards ought
to be less procyclical, deserves a more extended
analysis.
PAYMENT SYSTEM RISK, PLUS: The design of the
various payment-clearing and trading systems that
underpin the financial system can be a source of
risk propagation. This is close to the historical
sense of systemic risk, and correctly leads to the
need for certain payment-clearing and settlement
and trading systems to operate with central
counterparties and more standardized contracts on
recognized exchanges. Payment-clearing and
settlement systems matter for the propagation of
risk and for the ability of authorities to deal
effectively with problems at one institution, while
isolating impacts on others.
This system needs to be extended to other
market-clearing mechanisms – a current example
is the failure to require robust arrangements in 
the market for credit default swaps (see Federal
Reserve Board of New York 2008). A single
organization needs clear authority to identify
potentially systemically important markets and 
to require clearing houses and exchanges to be set
up. In Canada, this could be a natural extension
of the Bank of Canada’s existing power, but 
for certain markets it likely would have to be
implemented by securities commissions – here,
Canada’s lack of a national securities commission
would complicate implementation. 
NONPAYMENT SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS: Other
nonpayment-system-related interconnections
between financial institutions, as counterparties or
operational dependencies, also could propagate
material risk from one entity to others – this is the
“too-interconnected-to-fail” issue. Other types of
interconnection are hardly new; what the recent
crisis showed, however, was that market
participants failed to recognize the extent of their
interconnections and might have relied too much
for comfort on the too-big-to-fail doctrine. One
suitable response to this failure would be for
financial institutions to disclose more completely
to counterparties and regulators the size and
nature of their interconnections and the nature of
their exposure to risk to enable them and their
counterparties to react appropriately (see CRMPG
III 2008). It also suggests requiring large players
to broaden their stress testing to consider more
sophisticated event risk and more sophisticated
analysis of concentrations of exposure. This would
not require new rules or macroprudential
overrides of regulatory, monetary, or fiscal
decisions. 
Key to success here would be the ability to deal
with a problem at one large entity without
propagating life-threatening impacts to others.
That does not mean macroprudential regulation,
but better information on interconnections; better
tools; more effective, coordinated bankruptcy or
conservatorship powers, together with authority to
guarantee liabilities if necessary; and better| 6 Commentary 296
execution in crises. Practising how authorities
would handle failure of large financial institutions,
including understanding where they would get the
necessary resources, would make a major contri-
bution to system resilience. Doing so would
require participation of all authorities in a country
and, arguably, would benefit from major cross-
border participation. It would take serious effort
to be successful.
SYSTEMIC-IMPACT EVENTS: Some events can affect
the entire system or significant parts of it, and
thus can pose systemwide problems such as
unsuspected correlations between risks in panic
situations – for example, the Y2K scare,
pandemics, earthquakes, and other major market
disruptions. Systemwide events call for a broader
approach than prudential supervisors often have
been able to take. Event risk of this sort is, I
believe, rightly handled by involving each
authority and market participant in appropriate
systemwide monitoring, analysis, and stress and
scenario testing. The process might then identify
the policy remedies, if any, within each
competency that is appropriate to the situation. 
As with all stress testing, the key is to consider
plausible but realistically stressful situations.
Sometimes the policy remedy is to deal directly
with the situation in order to reduce the risks, and
sometimes resilience requires more financial
buffers. The challenge is to have the mindset to
take these tests seriously, an attribute that has not
always been evident in national authorities or
international financial institutions. 
A key priority, in my view, is for central banks
and regulators to develop an analytical framework
of macroprudential risks and risk mitigators, and
to enhance information collection, analysis, and
monitoring accordingly. This would parallel the
framework that microprudential supervisors use to
assess the risks and resiliency of individual
institutions. Some of the macroprudential risk
categories might be the same as those supervisors
use – for example, credit risk, operational risk, and
liquidity risk – but the focus of the monitoring
and analysis would differ. 
The framework would cover markets and more
than just regulated institutions – indeed, that is
where additional analysis and monitoring could be
most useful. For example, for credit risk, the
macro framework would look for the presence of
bubble conditions in various markets, measures of
leverage in various parts of the system, and
indicators of pricing overshoots. For operational
risk, the framework would look to changes in
systemwide operational vulnerabilities and
identify operational risk concentrations – for
example, entities that play key operational roles in
several important markets. In addition, the
framework could have uniquely macro elements,
such as monitoring signs of stress related to
various macro imbalances. Interconnections
(direct and indirect) could play a more prominent
role in the macro framework than they would in
the micro framework. For a country such as
Canada, there should be a foreign element, even if
just as a way to monitor and assess the adequacy
of domestic buffers. The central bank would be
key in leading this analysis on a broader basis, but
the prudential supervisor could make a major
contribution from its perspective and risk-
database related to regulated institutions. 
Such a framework, in my view, is essential to
promoting effective analysis and monitoring, to
supporting the judgments that authorities will
need to make, including with respecting to
tradeoffs, and to enhancing communication with
markets and thereby clarifying market
expectations. Macro system stress testing and
scenario building, which some central banks and
regulators have resisted, also need to be much
more frequent – doing this only when the FSAP
team comes to call is not sufficient. Better
information about the links between the regulated
and unregulated sectors would be important to do
this well. Major unregulated players should be
asked to participate in such stress analysis from a
systemic perspective, which would also take
resources and commitment. 
The scenario methodology that should be
adopted is to catalogue potential low-probability
but high-impact events, analyze the balance of
forces impinging on them, and monitor for
changes in the balance of those forces (see McColl
1999).
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SYSTEMWIDE EXCESSIVE RISK: The report of 
the G-20 Working Group on Enhancing Sound
Regulation and Strengthening Transparency
(2009b) refers to a macroprudential overlay to
deal with systemwide developments that lead to 
a systemwide build-up of excessive risk. What
does this mean? 
We know that many of the causes of the current
crisis were foreseen by someone, even if the
totality was not. We know that there were failures
of action. We also know that deliberate policy
choices by certain governments were a
contributing factor, as was some countries’ failure
to coordinate macro policies while encouraging
leverage and broad access to home ownership. 
So what is presaged by this macroprudential
overlay? Is this about recognition of asset bubbles
and action by authorities, including monetary
authorities, to lean against them? How are the
well-known tradeoffs between this and other
monetary policy goals to be determined? Is this
about macro considerations overriding normal
regulatory or supervisory action? Or is it about
collective action by authorities to limit the build-
up of leverage or the extension of financial services
to a whole new range of borrowers who might
have unrecognized risk characteristics? 
Here, the nexus with other policies and
responsibilities is likely to be much closer, and so
the policy tradeoffs are much more important.
And it might be unrealistic to expect prudential
regulators or even central banks to convince
governments or legislatures to put
macroprudential considerations at the forefront.
However, if countries choose to adopt a more
risky point on the tradeoff curve, it is reasonable
to expect them to be better prepared to deal with
resulting shocks. 
Government policy choices that have huge
impacts on the build-up of unsustainable bubbles
and stresses in the financial system can be quite
varied. Recent examples include global savings
imbalances related to monetary and fiscal policy
choices in the United States; exchange-rate and
pro-savings policies in China and other parts of
Asia; stresses in certain euro-zone countries from
the exchange rate at which they joined the zone;
promotion of debt for home ownership by tax
preferences and government guarantees (though
not in Canada); and “light touch” regulation in
the United Kingdom.
Yet, we need to be realistic about what
macroprudential regulation can achieve in the face
of these sorts of influences. Nor should we muddy
the mandate of prudential authorities in pursuit of
macroprudential stability. How is this supposed to
play out in the case of a particular problem
financial institution? We would not want OSFI to
shade its judgment on whether an entity is viable
on the basis of concern about systemic
implications. But it is reasonable to expect that
the speed and method of resolution of a problem
might be affected by such considerations.
Greater clarity of what this means in practice is
essential to avoid a muddle. Better monitoring by
authorities following a well-developed framework
would help immensely. Most financial crises,
including the current one, resulted from high
leverage and significant concentrations of risk (see
Minsky 1986; Kindleberger and Aliber 2005). But
good macro data on, and monitoring of, various
measures of leverage at both the domestic and
international level are virtually nonexistent, and
monitoring and stress testing to explore the risks
in concentrations could improve materially. This
by itself would be a major contribution to
financial stability. 
The Procyclicality of Rules
Defining the Problem
The procyclicality of capital rules refers to the idea
that the minimum capital required under the
Basel II accord, which is based on banks’ internal
risk ratings, will rise in economic downturns as
risk increases. Normally, in a recession, available
capital might decline, owing to reduced net
income. The worry is that banks’ responses – for
example, cutting back on lending as capital
requirements increase in a downturn – will
exacerbate the economic cycle. This is related to
overall credit cycles. 
For this reason, concerns exist about the
procyclicality of rules for capital and provisioning.| 8 Commentary 296
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Both the G-20 (2009b) and the Turner report
(2009) in the United Kingdom propose a
combination of automatic capital adjustments and
judgment to build up buffers in good times. More
clarity is needed on goals to bring the right tools
to bear. I favour discretionary approaches using
the existing tools in the Basel II accord with a
material increase in international coordination
and better links and coordination between
regulators and those with macro perspectives. I
also believe that the behaviour of rating agencies
and markets should be altered for any proposal to
be effective. 
One needs, however, to distinguish between the
credit cycle and asset bubbles. Traditionally, the
credit cycle has been seen as systemwide, while
asset bubbles are phenomena that develop late in
the upswing in specific sectors and burst close to
the upper turning point – over the past two
decades, there have been examples in housing,
commercial real estate, and dot-com high-tech
shares.
Leaning against bubbles refers to the idea that
economic upswings, periods of monetary laxity, or
global imbalances might be accompanied by high,
bubble-like growth in certain asset markets, and
suggests that the tools in Basel II should be used
to counter those conditions and, it is hoped, to
reduce the size and impact on the economy as a
whole of the subsequent correction in those
markets. Different tools would be used for
different cases – for example, overall adjustment
to required capital minimums would not target a
housing bubble, but some countries tried
overriding certain banks’ overly optimistic models
of housing risk, which could be helpful if better
coordinated and pursued more aggressively. And
because the effects of credit cycles and asset
bubbles are likely to differ across countries and
across different cycles, it is hard to see how
relatively automatic measures based on macro
variables could be effective. Dealing with
procyclicality resulting from credit cycles on an
automatic basis would require determining
turning points in economic cycles before the fact.
This is not likely to be possible – we have never
been successful in putting monetary or fiscal
policy on automatic pilot for similar reasons.
However, it could be helpful to strengthen and
systematize the surveillance work of the IMF 
and national authorities by feeding indicators 
of these cycle and bubble effects into periodic
discretionary regulatory or macroeconomic
judgments. Such a strategy would mirror and
support what OSFI successfully did in Canada
in the late 1990s, when the agency pushed for
higher provisions and capital levels for Canadian
banks. Indeed, having a better understanding 
of the framework and associated monitoring 
of macro risk would have helped OSFI in
reaching its judgments and explaining and
justifying its actions.
How Big Is the Problem?
Before we can design new measures, we need to
have more information on the size and nature of
the problem. The Canadian experience shows
that, under the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I),
capital ratios have not been static (see Figure 1).
Over the past two decades, actual Tier 1 (core)
capital ratios of the major banks have roughly
doubled, due to a combination of regulatory
pressure in the mid-late 1990s – OSFI’s intro-
duction of higher capital targets – and, more
recently, market and rating-agency pressure. It is
not possible to measure exactly how much these
increased capital ratios have been offset by the rise
in off-balance-sheet assets. There is no published
information on the size of the procyclical effect
under Basel II, although it has been mitigated by
the design of the Basel II parameters and by
banks’ being encouraged to use parameters in their
internal models that look beyond the short-term
horizon and factor in downturns (for instance, by
way of “through-the-cycle measures”).
In Canada, changes in the major banks’ risk-
weighted assets were different under the Basel I
and II measures during 2008 and the first quarter
of 2009 according to the banks’ own quarterly
reports (see Figure 2); however, that is the only
source of parallel information available, and it is
hard to see a clear pattern. Lack of information
means that measures should not be hardwired, but
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Figure 1: Capital Ratios of Canada's Tier 1 Banks, 1990–2008 
Note: Tier 1 capital is defined by the Basel rules and is essentially a bank’s high-quality, core capital.
Sources: Annual reports of the Bank of Nova Scotia, CIBC, Royal Bank of Canada, and TD Canada Trust, various issues. 
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Figure 2: Change in Risk-Weighted Assets of Canada's Tier 1 Banks under the Basel I and Basel II
Accords, 2008:1Q–2009:1Q
Note: Risk-weighted assets have been adjusted to remove the impact of the temporary OSFI floor.
Sources: Quarterly reports of the Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, CIBC, Royal Bank of Canada, and TD Canada Trust, various issues.| 10 Commentary 296
disclosure by banks of the degree of procyclicality
in their capital models is important to
determining a policy response and in influencing
the behaviour of markets and rating agencies.
Some proposals would tie capital requirements to
macro indicators or to such financial sector indicators
as profits, rather than establish requirements based on
institutional risk alone. This could lead to an
individual bank’s capital requirements diverging
significantly from its risk, but this might encourage
the bank to manage its affairs so as to avoid capital
requirements. Measures unrelated to the riskiness of
individual banks also could act perversely: if the rules
require banks to increase capital in an upswing, a
bank with a unique large loss could find its problem
exacerbated. 
Altering Market Behaviour
Market participants’ behaviour needs to change if
these proposals are to be effective. To date, this
requirement has not been considered adequately.
There is a complex interaction between minimum
capital requirements, market and rating-agency
perceptions of banks’ safety and soundness over an
economic cycle, accounting rules, desired capital held
by banks, and economic capital measures used by
banks in their lending decisions. In particular, the
rules under Basel II and market forces are leading
banks to hold desired capital well above the
minimum. Banks have incentives to manage their
actual and desired capital so that they do not have to
raise expensive or unavailable capital during a
downturn or lose core customers. So banks’ desired
and actual capital is likely to be less procyclical than
the minimum capital required under Basel II. 
Proposals that neglect these factors could make the
economic cycle worse. To work, reforms need to be
symmetrical, but they might not work out that way if
wrongly designed. For example, some procyclicality
proposals, had they been in place during the past five
years, would have raised minimum capital
requirements as the upswing proceeded. To be
effective, they would have led to increases in desired
and actual capital held. Now would be the time to
lower minimum requirements under these proposals
as the downturn occurs, but rating agencies and
counterparties might well see capital reductions as
weakness in current markets. If these realities had
prevented capital reductions from being effective, the
previous increases would have made the downturn
worse! Expectations of a variety of market participants
would have to be altered if the reform proposals are to
be effective; dictates from central banks and regulators
likely would not be enough. 
A number of measures would help change banks’
behaviour. For example, most banks now use
variants of point-in-time and through-the-cycle
measures, but no major internationally active banks
should use point-in-time measures in their models,
and they should be required to analyze and report to
supervisors and markets the degree to which their
estimates are through the cycle. Banks also should
have incentives to set desired capital targets for the
high and low points of the cycle, not just their static
measures as is now the case, taking account of the
cyclical sensitivity of their own portfolios. If banks
do not move to publish these after a reasonably
short period of testing, we should consider requiring
them to do so. Further, rating agencies should give
stress test results and banks’ dynamic targets, not
just static metrics, much more weight in their rating
methodology.
Reducing capital requirements in downturns
might increase risk taking by banks at such times
– including making risky acquisitions at the
wrong time on the basis that capital requirements
will go down. Macroeconomists want banks to
lend in downturns, while regulators want them to
avoid doing something stupid. Coordination
mechanisms need to respect these differences and
to find an appropriate balance. 
Canada’s experience with general provisions for
loan losses is salutary in terms of what can happen
if behaviour is not adjusted (see Figures 3 and 4).
OSFI succeeded in the late 1990s in pushing for
higher general provisions and, internationally,
regulators successfully pushed accounting
standards setters to allow a broader range of
factors to influence provisioning. But the two
figures show that the goal of having general
provisions rise semi-automatically during
upswings and decline during downturns has not
been achieved, in part because inadequate
attention was paid to how markets and other
actors, such as auditors, would react.
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Figure 3: General Allowances to Loans and Bankers' Acceptances, Canada's Tier 1 Banks, 2003–09
Source: PriceWaterhouse Coopers Canada, Canadian Banks: Perspectives on the Canadian Banking Industry. Toronto, various years.
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Figure 4: Specific Allowances to Loans and Bankers' Acceptances, Canada's Tier 1 Banks, 2003–09
Source: PriceWaterhouse Coopers Canada, Canadian Banks: Perspectives on the Canadian Banking Industry. Toronto, various years.| 12 Commentary 296
The Importance of Buffers above
Minimum Capital
For risk-based capital rules to be effective, buffers
of actual capital above minimum should expand
and contract over a cycle. Banks that have higher
buffers could allow their capital ratios to decline
further as economic conditions deteriorate before
they would have to take action to pull back
lending. So increasing the margin of actual over
required capital (measured at the midpoint of a
cycle) would deal in part with procyclicality issues.
Markets are already creating this result.
We don’t need to design new architecture to
deal with the pro-cyclicality issue. The stress-
testing requirements already in the Basel II rules
should be used more aggressively to deal with
procyclicality concerns at systemically important
banks. These requirements are a key tool for
ensuring that buffers are appropriate. There is
room, for example, for supervisors and central
banks to share information internationally on the
appropriate macro stress tests that should be
applied by their major banks during upswings.
Authorities should make clear that they would not
expect banks to hold capital to meet the same
stress tests, starting from a lower base, during
downturns. It would also be helpful if stress test
results for major banks were reported annually to
supervisors, compared internationally, and a
summary published showing the average and
range of approaches and outcomes. Such a change
might be a waypoint to broader regular disclosure.
And making progress in these areas will be
helped immeasurably when the U.S. completes
adoption of Basel II, which is still not yet fully in
place in that country. Canada, Europe, Japan and
a range of other countries, in contrast, are now
well into Basel II implementation. 
The Will to Act
Dealing with asset bubbles and credit cycles on a
discretionary basis requires a mechanism for
identifying when certain markets are overheating
or when the credit cycle overall is likely to turn.
This requires judgment and willingness to act.
That is why the analytical macro-risk framework
and monitoring I suggest above is so important.
Actions in one country without the possibility of
coordination with others can open up material
competitive advantages and disadvantages, so it is
necessary to design processes that support and
encourage the exercise of judgment and
willingness to act internationally – an aspect on
which the G-20 report (2009b) is light.
It is here that the roles of central banks and
prudential regulators are key. One or more
authorities, domestically and internationally, need to
believe that their job is regularly to monitor for
overheated conditions in specific markets. In Canada,
the Bank of Canada naturally could lead in that role,
with OSFI contributing from its perspective. Each
needs to be accountable for its input and for the
conclusions reached and actions taken (or not taken)
based on that input. They need to report their views
to a coordinating body for exchanges of views and
follow-up, but one body should not override others’
mandates. Internationally, the revamped FSB might
work this way; in Canada, as FISC, by statute, focuses
on individual institutions, there could be a new body
with a specific focus on macrostability issues and
involving key securities commissions and perhaps
others as well.
To deal with procyclicality on a purely discre-
tionary basis, without certainty or continuity of
capital rules, would lead to markets’ being surprised
and would reduce effectiveness. Hence, the frame-
work should be communicated to markets on a
periodic basis. But the way in which monetary
policy or fiscal policy is regularly adjusted should
not be the model for prudential capital rules. 
Who Needs Regulating for Safety 
and Soundness? 
The issues of who ought to be regulated for the
safety and soundness of the financial system and
what macrostability regulation means are
intertwined. There are some obvious agreed
points, such as effective, comprehensive,
consolidated regulation and supervision of banks,
investment banks, and insurers by a well-resourced
organization. The United States did not follow
these practices in all cases, and Canada does not
for dealers that are independent of banks or for
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parts of the credit union movement. But what
about the so-called shadow banking system?
Historically, authorities constructed the regulatory
dike at the edge of the banking, insurance, and
investment banking sector and took several
actions to reinforce that dike, relying on
regulating banks’ relations with the conduits,
hedge funds, and off-balance-sheet vehicles,
including seeing that there was adequate capital to
deal with eventualities. 
It seems to me that the current crisis shows us
that we needed to have done this better, not
necessarily by having broader safety and soundness
regulations or extending the implied safety net.
Some of the assessments of stress impacts clearly
were not severe enough, nor were all the linkages
among markets, other entities, and banks well
understood. Some countries, notably the United
States, did not follow the model fully. But is that
model of where to draw the line now obsolete? Do
we need somehow to identify other systemically
important players and have some prudential
regulatory system in place? Even now it is not
clear that hedge funds, for example, were in any
sense a cause of the current crisis, though they
were part of the transmission mechanism once the
problem was well started. 
The leaders of the G-20 (2009a) propose to
amend regulatory systems so that authorities are able
to “identify and take account” of macroprudential
risks across the system, including in banks, shadow
banks, and private pools of capital. That is consistent
with my view of the importance of better
monitoring and analysis of interconnections. There is
also to be “oversight to ensure they have adequate
risk management” (2009a, 3). But the G-20 leaders
seem to contemplate no power to force changes if
risk management is not adequate or to limit
exposures or leverage in these systemically important
entities. This holds the risk of creating responsibility
without authority.
Central banks and regulators should have access
to information from nonregulated players so that
they are better able exercise their mandates with
respect to the financial stability of the regulated
sector. But an explicit mandate for stability more
broadly, accompanied by a right to more
information with unclear power to require changes
outside the regulated sector when a serious problem
is believed to be brewing, would not be helpful. It
would be better if the status of these systemically
important shadow entities with respect to lender-
of-last-resort funding were clearer. 
The US plan (see United States 2009), in
contrast to that of the G-20, has a clear and
coherent hierarchy: registration and information
from private pools of capital to allow assessment of
systemic risk, and authority to deem entities to be
systemic and subject to prudential standards and
requirements with respect to capital, liquidity, and
risk management and to prompt corrective action. 
Shoring Up the Dike and the Mandate 
to Obtain Information
What is required is much better shoring up of the
dike between the regulated and unregulated players,
which would make it more credible that others will
be permitted to fail. Part of that shoring up involves
risk-management practices, monitoring, and
perhaps rules regarding individual banks’ gross and
net financial exposure to unregulated entities,
provisions that the G-20 plan includes.
Any shoring up of a dike requires being able to see
what is happening on the other side of it, in order to
ensure that it is high enough to serve its purpose. So
we should ensure that the financial authorities are
given more information on what is occurring in the
unregulated sector, both in aggregate and for specific
larger players. Then, relevant surveillance of
regulated players, based on a more realistic analysis
and macro stress testing, could be performed
regularly. At the same time, it must be made clear
that knowledge of what is happening in the
unregulated sector is needed to help the authorities
fulfill their mandate to ensure the stability of
regulated entities, not to regulate the entities outside
the dike. I would not go farther than that. 
Some observers support a system of prudential
regulation extended to a much wider range of
players. However, it is hard to sort out in advance
what should be the criteria for choosing how to
extend the net. The G-20 and other reports duck
this issue. Some suggest that any entity above a
certain size, leverage, and dependency on
wholesale funding should face simple prudentialIndependent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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regulation like an investment bank or commercial
bank (see, for example, Eatwell and Persaud
2008), but I doubt this could work in practice –
and regulatory capriciousness based on “I know a
systemic entity when I see one” is not desirable. 
The pressures of competition and availability of
capital and talent will lead to new entities being
set up outside of the prudentially regulated sphere.
Substantial players might well re-emerge that are
essentially the same as the regulated entities.
Should these be regulated? Some will say yes, and
if they are in fact systemically important, it is hard
to disagree. This might make a case for a backstop
authority to designate entities that are systemically
important – and engaged in activities equivalent
to those of investment or other banks – and
subjecting them to some form of regulation. 
To extend bank-style regulation broadly, along
with a safety net, would be costly and likely to divert
the attention of regulators from their main tasks.
However, enhanced disclosure requirements for the
extended entities should be part of any new system
(see CRMPG III 2008). It used to be argued that
this was pointless as positions can change rapidly
and positions were proprietary. Perhaps, but even
information at a fairly high level that is several
months old can give markets and authorities some
sense of areas in need of further investigation.
Who Should Be in Charge?
There is often a temptation to make one
organization responsible for dealing with events
with systemwide impacts and build-up of risk and
with adjusting capital rules over credit cycles or
asset bubbles. My experience suggests that would
be a mistake. What is necessary is constructive
challenge and an effective forum in which to reach
an accommodation of views in the limited number
of cases where there are conflicts of mandates.
Having one mandate or one organization that
trumps others is likely to lead to problems.
It is clear that supervisory agencies can struggle
to develop and use macroeconomic skills. On the
other hand, prudential supervisors’ mind-sets are
correctly focused on risks, negative outcomes, and
the tails of the distribution of outcomes. And they
often have extensive knowledge of institutions,
complex products, and the details of risks and risk
management. They also have important tools with
which to effect corrective action at the level of
individual institutions, which is often where such
action should be taken. A focus on this mandate,
and not confusing it with others, is a success
factor in my view. 
Historically, some central banks have found it
hard to develop and maintain valuable expertise in
the financial stability area. For the purposes of
their core monetary policy task, it is more
important for them to think about, research, and
forecast the central point of the distribution of
economic outcomes, not the size of the tails.
Financial stability and prudential regulation, on
the other hand, are all about the tails of the
distribution of outcomes. If central banks are to
play a larger role in macroprudential surveillance
and monitoring and if supervisory institutions are
to consider the macro aspects, they need to be
better staffed and organized. And maintaining
links with a wider range of systemically important
nonbank market participants, rather than just the
biggest, requires the right kind of expertise as well.
In some countries, central banks are also bank
supervisors; in fact, no one approach is
demonstrably superior, nor does the central bank
have to be the supervisor to contribute a
macroprudential view and have it heard. In
Canada, however, it would be unwise to shift the
responsibility for bank regulation or supervision
to the Bank of Canada. Nor should it be able to
dictate prudential rules, or supervisory actions
with respect to individual institutions
The Importance of an Effective 
Challenge Process
I believe that the regulatory system could benefit
from challenges and multiple contributions from
different perspectives. That argues for a structured
process involving authorities that subsequently act
in their individual realms of competence, which
also allows for constructive tension between
mandates to be worked out. Each authority,
however, should remain accountable for the
exercise of the powers it has in its primaryCommentary 296 | 15
mandate. I do not think we want a central bank or
treasury dictating to a prudential supervisor when
to alter capital requirements, just as we would not
want a supervisor or treasury dictating to a central
bank how to handle asset bubbles, or a central
bank or supervisor telling a treasury how to handle
tax or guarantee policies that promote leverage.
What we do need is an effective forum in which
different points of view can be brought to the
table and considered, after which each participant
would act in its own sphere. In cases of serious
disagreement, participants should be able to
challenge one another’s views and be accountable
for their conclusions. One authority needs to own
this process, but that is very different from owning
the whole problem and having all the tools.
Strengthening the links between regulators and
central banks is key. This is, however, a two-way street.
Even in Canada, where I believe the links are very
good, the Bank of Canada could have better
understood from OSFI what was happening with
individual institutions during the credit crisis, while
OSFI could have obtained better macro stress
assessment from the Bank. There are no impediments
to that happening – that kind of in-depth sharing does
not undermine anyone’s independence. I think the
Canadian experience of coordination generally has
been exemplary, supported by a long line of governors,
superintendents, and deputy ministers. They have
understood that senior-level engagement – on a regular
basis, not just in times of crisis – respect for one
another’s roles, high-quality, timely information
sharing, and joint contribution to strategy develop-
ment and execution are essential to effectiveness. FISC
works: it does promote the “will to act” by all. We do
not need memorandums of understanding and
protocols. The public post mortems on some other
countries’ recent failures suggest that they could learn
from Canada’s experience. 
The Role of Securities Regulators
Securities regulators need to be part of the system,
but how? In Canada, that is a unique challenge. If
we had a national securities regulator, the head of
such an organization would also be a member of
FISC or a separate financial stability committee.
But with our current securities regulatory
structure, we would need to add twelve people
(one for each jurisdiction), or at least the four
most important. There are also important
potential conflicts of roles and mandates and legal
authorities – such as the issue of disclosure versus
secrecy during pre-crisis periods. But the benefits,
including cooperation and coordination in
preparing and sharing information on what is
occurring in markets from a financial-stability
perspective, are hugely important. We don’t want
well-functioning, existing coordination
mechanisms between federal authorities to be
disrupted. So, if we have to form a separate
committee on system stability, that would be fine
as well. It should be chaired by the Finance
department, not by OSFI or the Bank of Canada.
Finance is best placed to help participants bring
together and reconcile what may be different
views from those with macro and micro expertise. 
Regardless, adding systemic stability to the
mandate of a securities commission would require
a different focus and expertise to be brought to
bear, which would be a challenge, and which is
why I see a commission’s roles as contributory, not
leading on macro stability issues. 
This also raises the issue of what happens when
federal authorities identify an issue of material
financial stability in markets where the only tools
are in the hands of provincial commissions or the
self-regulatory organizations that report to those
commissions. Significant persuasion and follow-up
would be necessary, but having a structured process
in which representatives of commissions
participate would be an improvement on what
Canada has now, even if it would be less than ideal. 
The Will to Act: Peer Assessments 
Finally, recall that various authorities or critics
recognized many of the risks to the stability of the
financial system over the past decade, which only
serves to highlight the importance of the will to
act. But the will to act cannot be legislated or
written into rules. Partly, it derives from effective
processes, with continuity, follow-up, and
supportive resources. I hope the redesigned FSF,
with interaction among the G-20, the BIS, the
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Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and
the IMF will be an improvement internationally.
Success will depend on the leaders of these
organizations taking this mandate seriously,
following good processes, giving it adequate
resources, and being open to contrarian views. 
The FSAP peer review process can support the
capability and will to act. The G-20 report (2009b)
rightly indicates that all G-20 countries should
commit to undertaking such a review, and that the
basis on which countries are assessed should be
broadened to encompass macroprudential oversight
and the scope of regulation. But systemically
impor-tant countries are to be subject to self-
assessments only every five years and updates are to
be only “in consultation with” the IMF and the
World Bank.
This does not go far enough. Reviews should 
also include the scope and effectiveness of crisis-
management and problem-resolution tools, and
there should be mandatory updates on a preset
schedule, with scope depending on circumstances.
Moreover, to be effective, the resources to do these
assessments at the IMF and World Bank need to be
increased and upgraded, more senior reviewers are
needed to challenge major countries effectively, and
senior staff and the boards of the international
financial institutions must treat the results of these
reviews with more seriousness. In addition, the core
principles for effective banking supervision under
the Basel accord need to be adjusted to reflect 
the recommendations of the G-20 leaders by, for
example, incorporating  critiera of an effective
process for adding a country’s macroprudential
input to decisionmaking by the central bank and
regulatory authority. 
Conclusion
The international community now has an oppor-
tunity to improve the coordination of microprudential
regulation with macro considerations. But to be
successful, the reform proposals need to meet a
number of criteria.
First, the major industrialized countries should
ensure that they have learned the lessons from the crisis
that has affected the existing system before rushing into
major changes in architecture. This includes ensuring
that they have effective, well-resourced, consolidated
regulation and supervision of banks, investment banks,
and insurers; better stress testing, including at a
systemwide level; better monitoring by regulators and
central banks, and the IMF and FSB of the two sources
of most crises – leverage and concentrations – both
within individual countries and internationally;  a better
understanding of interconnections; more effective ability
to force risk proofing of key markets; and better crisis
simulation and preparedness to deal with major problems
in financial institutions. For its part, Canada needs
minimal improvements to complete the comprehensive
consolidated regulation system, but ought to press ahead
with national securities regulation.
Second, the Bank of Canada and OSFI should
make major strides in monitoring, stress testing,
further risk proofing key market infrastructure, and
better understanding interconnections, without
fundamental mandate changes. The Bank could
contribute best from a macro perspective using its
knowledge of markets and clearing and settlement
systems, with OSFI contributing from a micro
perspective using its knowledge of institutions and
financial sector developments at a more detailed level. 
Third, as financial stability is added to the
mandates of national authorities, the FSB interna-
tionally and, in Canada, the Department of
Finance, the Bank of Canada, and OSFI need to
define better their expectations of the contribution
macroprudential regulation can make to system
stability. Initially, this should focus on better
monitoring of macroprudential risks and
developments and more focused macroprudential
input into policy decisions of governments,
regulators, and central banks. Policymakers should
be clear, however, that this would not eliminate 
risks to financial stability.
Fourth, the FSB and the Bank of Canada should
develop an analytical framework of macroprudential
risks and mitigators, with input from OSFI and
securities commissions, to complement OSFI’s well-
established microprudential risk framework. The
goal should be to ensure that macroprudential input
is added value, not just overlap and duplication of
existing risk assessment by banks and prudential
regulators. This macro framework should focus
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much more broadly than on regulated banks and
insurers. The Bank, in cooperation with OSFI and
securities commissions, should use this framework to
drive enhanced data collection and the monitoring
and analysis of macroprudential risk indicators to
support discretionary judgments by those responsible
for whether, when, and how to adjust various policy
tools. That would also improve communication with
markets. The prime forum for discussion of these
judgments and for working out appropriate tradeoffs
among the goals and mandates of various authorities
should be the financial stability cooperation group
that I suggest below. 
Fifth, in implementing the recommendations of
the G-20, the minister of finance should not
fundamentally alter the mandates of the various
authorities (the Bank of Canada, OSFI, and
CDIC). It should be clear that the need to
contribute to financial stability should not alter
OSFI’s prime responsibility to regulate and
supervise institutions for safety and soundness and
to intervene early to resolve problems, nor should
it alter the Bank’s responsibility for monetary
policy – indeed, both mandates already contribute
to financial stability. The Bank’s mandate to deal
with systemic payment-clearing and settlement
systems perhaps should be expanded to include
systems that underlie securities transactions. The
federal government should not assign
responsibility for macroprudential stability or
authority to override microprudential or other
policy decisions to one agency, but should expect
material enhancements in the input of each into
others’ decisionmaking. The Bank could lead in
macrofinancial analysis and monitoring, but there
is a material role for OSFI as well. 
Sixth, the FSB should design better processes
internationally, to support challenges and improve
the effectiveness of decisionmaking by the various
authorities within their core mandates. In Canada,
this means the government’s putting in place a
formal financial stability cooperation group similar
to the existing Financial Institutions Supervisory
Committee (which should remain focused on
matters relating to institutions) that should involve
federal financial authorities and major securities
commissions. In its processes, this group should
consider and regularly monitor tail scenarios and
seek the views of outsiders on financial stability
issues. Securities commissions could contribute to,
but not lead on, macro stability issues. The group
should be advisory and not have the authority to
override any participant’s ability to meet its primary
mandate. It should be chaired by the finance
ministry (with beefed-up support), which is best
placed to help reconcile disparate views from other
participants.  
Seventh, internationally, the IMF should design a
better, more regular peer review process than the G-
20 contemplates to support the capability and will
to act. IMF financial sector assessments should also
include the scope and effectiveness of tools for crisis
management and problem resolution; there should
be mandatory updates for major countries on a
preset schedule, with scope depending on
circumstances; the Basel core principles for effective
banking supervision, which are the basis for
assessments, should be updated to reflect the G-20’s
recommendations; and the resources devoted to
assessment efforts should be increased materially.
Eighth, in Canada, the federal government
should not extend a safety and soundness mandate
to the shadow banking system. Rather, it should
give prudential regulators and central banks better
access to information about and risk assessment of
the linkages between regulated entities and other
market players. 
Finally, to address procyclicality of capital rules, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
national authorities responsible for implementing
Basel II, such as OSFI, should use existing tools
better, including stress testing under Basel II, to deal
with concerns about how regulations affect the
separate cases of asset bubbles and the credit cycle.
These measures should be discretionary, not based on
automatic alteration of prudential rules in response to
macro variables. Proposals should address directly the
need to change the behaviour of market participants
and rating agencies, not just of banks, through
changes in how they set and disclose capital targets
over a cycle and the methodology of rating agencies.
The Basel Committee and the national authorities
that are implementing Basel II should develop and
publish better information on the degree of
procyclicality in capital rules, and should proceed
cautiously and flexibly with discretion and disclosure.| 18 Commentary 296
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